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Computer Says No: Technology and Accountability in Policing Traffic Stops
Clare Kinsella and John McGarry∗
Abstract
The Road Traffic Act 1988 gives police in the United Kingdom the power to seize 
motor vehicles which they have reasonable grounds for believing are being driven 
without a valid driver’s licence or motor insurance. Drivers may then have to pay a 
fee to have their vehicles returned. When exercising this power of seizure, the police 
may rely on information contained on the Police National Computer (PNC) which is  
linked to the National Insurance Database (NID). Whilst these databases are 
undoubtedly invaluable in this endeavour, they are not always accurate, and 
incidents have occurred whereby motorists who are in fact driving with valid  
insurance have had their vehicles seized and retained.
Focusing on the case of Lisa, whose vehicle was wrongly impounded by Merseyside 
Police in 2007, and other cases, we explore the legitimacy and legality of such 
activity. We question both the discretionary power of the police in taking such action,  
and the validity of their (over) reliance on technology. We posit that the taking of  
money in cases such as Lisa’s is evidence of the turn within public policing towards 
marketisation, and consider the capacity for harm to innocent individuals and the 
implications for justice and fairness. Ultimately, we contend that police  
accountability is compromised and that a new approach is required. We close the  
piece with some recommendations for improved police practice. 
Introduction
In 2005, in the United Kingdom, the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA) was amended to 
give police the power to seize motor vehicles where they have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the vehicles are being driven without motor insurance or a valid driving 
licence [40; s.152].1 The police appear to be making vigorous use of this new power. 
The Motor Insurers’ Bureau claims that the police are seizing 500 uninsured vehicles 
per day [29]. It is likely that a similarly substantial number of vehicles are being 
seized because the police believe they are being driven without a driver’s licence. 
When making such seizures, the police often use information contained on the Police 
National Computer (PNC). Once seized, the owner of a vehicle may have to pay a fee 
to have it released.
 We would like to thank Julie Davies and Adam Pendlebury for their helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this chapter, and Vicky Conway and Dermot Walsh for their excellent editorial guidance. Any errors 
remain our own. Most importantly, we are grateful to Lisa for discussing her experiences with us and 
allowing us to use them here.
1 It should be noted that while in some countries drivers are required by law to display a valid insurance 
disc in their vehicle no such display requirement exists in the UK under the Road Traffic Act. Drivers 
must be able to produce evidence of insurance upon request but there can be a delay in the production 
of this evidence. 
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The Act therefore gives the police a considerable amount of discretionary power, the 
exercise of which may adversely affect innocent drivers. As we shall see, there is 
evidence that a significant number of seized vehicles are subsequently found to have 
been lawfully driven. In such cases, the innocent driver may experience distress, 
anxiety and inconvenience. 
We examine various aspects of this discretionary power. We draw on the experience 
of Lisa, who had her car seized under the RTA, in Liverpool, and consider other cases 
similar to hers. Lisa’s car was seized by officers from Merseyside Police in November 
2007 as being driven without insurance; it was, in fact, insured. She recounted the 
facts to us in a recorded interview on 4th November 2009. We examine the legality 
and legitimacy of the seizure power. In particular, we look at the grounds on which a 
vehicle may be seized, including the propriety of relying on, and the weight that 
should be attached to, information on the PNC. We also consider the legitimacy of 
charging owners to reclaim their property. Throughout the piece we reflect on the 
complex dynamics of discretion, accountability and technology, within the context of 
shifts from public to private policing, post-crime to pre-crime policing, and the 
infiltration of “low” policing by “high” policing. We explore the potential 
implications for trust, fairness and harm. We conclude by suggesting that existing 
accountability structures are not adequate for overseeing policing of this nature and 
make some recommendations for improved practice.
Lisa’s Case
Lisa was stopped by the police while driving with her brother to collect her son from 
nursery one weekday afternoon, at about 1pm, in November 2007. She encountered a 
police roadside operation which seemed to be checking whether cars were being 
driven lawfully – with a valid driving licence and motor insurance. The police 
appeared to be stopping cars at random and an officer indicated to Lisa that she 
should stop.
The officer checked Lisa’s details via police radio and said that no insurance entry for 
her car could be found. Lisa replied that the car was insured through DNA insurance. 
The officer laughed and stated that she must be mistaken, that DNA refers to a police 
test. In fact, he joked with one of his colleagues that she had misunderstood and 
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thought that DNA could be an insurance broker. Lisa responded that she realised that 
DNA was the name of a test used by the police, but reiterated that it was also the 
name of her broker. The officer said that they could find no record of it and that they 
would have to seize her car. 
Lisa told the officer that she could get her insurance certificate to prove that the car 
was insured and asked for it not to be removed in her absence. She was told that the 
car would be removed when there were a number of cars ready to be transported 
away. That is, the car would be kept for a short time but the police would not 
specifically hold it there.
It was about an hour before Lisa was able to return with proof of her insurance. She 
immediately noticed that her car had been removed. When the officer with whom she 
had previously dealt saw her, his first word was ‘shit’. Lisa said that the look on his 
face indicated that he realised a mistake had been made. She asked where her car was 
and he called his sergeant over who was, in her words, ‘very strict, very stern’. The 
sergeant explained that, as far as they had known she was driving without insurance 
and she had no proof to demonstrate otherwise. He said that they had kept her car for 
a short while but restated that once a certain number of vehicles have been seized all 
are removed. 
Lisa was instructed to present the proof of her insurance at a police station across the 
city, rather than the one closest to the scene. On arriving, after a long journey through 
school run traffic, she was kept waiting for about 20 minutes. When her insurance 
certificate had been confirmed as valid, she asked for the keys to her vehicle but was 
told that, rather than her car being at the station as she had been given to believe, it 
was being held at a car impound, about two miles from where she was first stopped. 
Further, she was informed that the impound had closed. This meant that she could not 
retrieve the car until the next day and so had to pay an overnight fee on top of the 
impound fee. 
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In total, Lisa had to pay £117 to have her car released.2 In interview she told us that as 
a single mother and a student this was a substantial amount of money to her and, in 
fact, she had to borrow the money from her father to pay the release fee.
Her father retrieved the car on her behalf the following morning. On doing so he 
found that it had a large yellow sticker across the windscreen, ‘which was an absolute 
swine to get off’. The notice was headed by Merseyside Police’s logo and stated in 
large black uppercase letters: ‘SEIZED BY POLICE DRIVEN WITHOUT 
INSURANCE’.3
Wider Context
Lisa’s car was probably seized as part of Operation Tango. This is the ‘total war 
declared by Merseyside Police on anti social (sic) and irresponsible drivers who use 
our roads’; its aim is that those who ‘use a vehicle in a crminal (sic) and anti social 
manner … will be caught, [their] vehicle … seized and [they] will be prosecuted’ [8].
Since hearing of this incident, we have become aware of other instances where 
insured drivers have had their cars seized. Two cases are particularly noteworthy. In 
March 2008, Cumbria police stopped Stephen Farndon’s car on the M6 motorway 
because it was shown on the National Insurance Database (NID) as being without 
insurance. It appears that Mr Farndon’s insurers had failed to register the details of his 
policy on the Database. Newspaper reports state that the police seized the vehicle and 
then stopped the traffic on a motorway slip road so that Mr Farndon, his wife, and two 
children could walk off the motorway carrying their 12 month old grandson [12]. 
Similarly, in January 2008 Stephen Booth had his car seized after police could not 
find his insurance details on the NID, even though he had renewed his insurance four 
days earlier. He refused to pay the £105 fee to recover his car, an amount of money 
that rose by £12 for every day that the car was held. The car was crushed fourteen 
days later [3].
As we noted in the introduction, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau claims that the police are 
using the NID to seize 500 uninsured vehicles per day throughout the UK. This 
2 £105 for removal of the vehicle and £12 for its retention for each 24 hour period, or part thereof. 
These charges are now £150 and £20 respectively [37].
3 The legality of this is explored elsewhere [25].
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equates to 182,500 vehicles per year. In addition to these, the police may be seizing a 
similarly high number of vehicles where they believe they are being driven without a 
valid driver’s licence.4 
In reply to a number of Freedom of Information requests, many police forces 
informed us that they do not collate information on how many seized vehicles are 
subsequently discovered to have been driven lawfully. Some were, however, able to 
give us some indicative figures.5 Leicestershire Constabulary estimate that between 
2% and 4% of the total number of vehicles seized are later found to be lawfully 
driven.6 Figures supplied by Norfolk Constabulary indicate that, for them, it is about 
2.5%.7 Cheshire Constabulary state that in 2009 they paid for the recovery of just 
under 1% of vehicles seized.8 This does not represent the full figure of vehicles that 
have been seized when lawfully driven as the force does not pay where the seizures 
were the result of errors made by the DVLA or insurance companies. Figures from 
other forces indicate that refunds have been made in 0.089% to 0.584% of cases9 – 
though, again, this only accounts for a portion of vehicles seized but later found to be 
driven lawfully as refunds are not made in all cases. Though varied and incomplete, 
these figures suggest that a significant number of vehicles seized may, in fact, be 
lawfully driven.
Stopping and Seizing Vehicles
Section 163 of the RTA obliges drivers to stop their vehicles when required to do so 
by a uniformed officer. It is reasonably settled law that, under this provision, an 
officer does not need any grounds to stop a vehicle provided she does not act 
‘capriciously or in bad faith, [and] provided there is no malpractice or oppression or 
4 There does not seem to be any readily available data on how many vehicles are seized as being driven 
without a valid driver’s licence.
5 Many replies emphasised that different police forces capture and record the data in different ways, 
therefore this information should not be used to make comparisons between forces.
6 Freedom of Information (FOI) reply, 25 February 2010.
7 FOI reply, 30 April 2010.
8 FOI reply, 12 March 2010.
9 Bedfordshire = 0.126% (FOI reply, 1 March 2010); Kent = 0.2% (10 March 2010); Lancashire = 
0.263% (5 March 2010); Merseyside = 0.331% (22 February 2010); Metropolitan Police = 0.584% (18 
March 2010) Nottinghamshire = 0.089% (24 February 2010); South Yorkshire = 0.168% (12 March 
2010).
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opprobrious behaviour.’10 This is a power which also exists in parallel at common 
law.11 
Once stopped, a driver may also be required to produce the following documents for 
examination: the driving licence and its counter part [36; s.164(1)]; the relevant 
certificate of motor insurance or other evidence that the vehicle is not being driven 
without third party cover; and an MOT test certificate [36; s.165]. A failure to 
produce these documents when required to do so is an offence [36; ss. 164(6) and 
165(3)]. It is a defence, though, if the driver produces the required documents at a 
police station within seven days [36; ss. 164(8) and 165(4)].
If a driver cannot produce their licence or insurance certificate, and a uniformed 
officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is being driven without 
licence or insurance, she may seize it [36; s.165A insert by 40; s.152].12  A central 
question when assessing the legitimacy and legality of a seizure is whether the officer 
had the necessary reasonable grounds for belief. 
Reasonableness is not defined in the legislation but case law indicates that it is an 
objective test13 which is ultimately a question for the court: the court must be satisfied 
that the knowledge and perceptions of the officer at the time were sufficient to give 
rise to reasonable grounds and this assessment is not to be made with the benefit of 
hindsight.14 The threshold for reasonable belief is higher than that for reasonable 
suspicion,15 yet, like reasonable suspicion, stereotypical images are not enough to give 
rise to reasonable belief.16 What is sufficient will vary from case to case but the 
officer is entitled to take into account all available information.17 
10 R (Beckett) v Aylesbury County Court [2004] EWHC 100, [13].
11 R (Beckett) v Aylesbury County Court [2004] EWHC 100 and Chief Constable of Gwent v Dash 
[1986] RTR 41 (QBD) 46.
12 During the passage of the Bill, the human rights organisation JUSTICE questioned whether this 
provision might infringe the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions protected by Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights. They also state that the Article 6 right 
to have one’s civil rights determined by a fair and impartial tribunal is also engaged, see Ireland [16; 
para 78].
13 Bucknell v DPP [2006] EWHC 1888, [9].
14 Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] HRLR 249 (QBD) [6].
15 ‘Suspicion is a state of mind well short of belief …’, Hughes LJ in Buckley & Ors v The Chief  
Officer of Thames Valley Police [2009] EWCA Civ 356, [7].
16 DPP v L [2005] EWHC 1229, [30].
17 DPP v L [2005] EWHC 1229, [29].
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As we see in our example, factors on which the police may rely to seize a vehicle 
include the absence of the driver’s insurance details from the database; that the driver 
cannot immediately provide proof of insurance; and the officer’s failure to recognise 
the name of the insurance company.18 We will examine the sufficiency of these in 
turn.
Prioritising Technology?
The PNC will often be relied on when searching for a driver’s insurance details. This 
is linked to the NID. Merseyside Police’s current Policy and Procedure on the Seizure 
and Retention of Vehicles states that the absence of a motorist’s details from the 
database can only give rise to reasonable suspicion; reasonable belief requires more:
The PNC indicating either insurance ‘not held’ or ‘unlicensed driver’ is only 
sufficient to provide suspicion. The officer must establish further grounds to 
support a reasonable belief based on their own personal knowledge, other 
supporting intelligence and information provided by the driver. These further 
grounds must be recorded in the officers (sic) pocket notebook (emphasis added).
[26]19
This is consistent with the view of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, which manages the 
NID. They state that the police cannot seize a vehicle simply because it is absent from 
the Database; rather, the Database is an aid to help form the reasonable belief that a 
car is being driven uninsured [28]. 
Providers of insurance are obliged to supply the details of all insured vehicles to the 
Database.20 Yet, the Database should not be taken as being necessarily comprehensive 
or up-to-date, this is for at least two reasons. First, information is loaded onto the 
Database mainly by insurance companies directly [30]. There is, then, room for error; 
companies may fail to load the data or may do so incorrectly. A number of police 
18 More grounds may become apparent as police practice develops and other cases emerge but these 
seem to be the most likely common grounds.
19 It does not appear as though the preceding policy contains similar advice: The Removal of Vehicles  
from the Road: Statement of Policy (2006).
20 Under ss 95(2) and 145(2) RTA, those providing motor insurance must be a member of the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau which requires its members to enter the details of motor insurance polices on the 
Database. Also, the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation 
Body) Regulations (Number 37) r. 5 obliges insurers to provide this information to the Motor Insurance 
Information Centre (essentially, the MID) when required to do so.
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forces have indicated that this is a main cause of insured vehicles being seized 
erroneously.21 Second, there may be a delay in loading the information onto the 
database. For privately owned vehicles, information should be entered onto the 
Database within seven days of the insurance policy starting [27], meaning that the 
details may be missing from the Database for this period of time. In addition, it is 
possible that an insurance company may take longer than the rules allow to upload 
data. It therefore seems appropriate to assume that the absence of the details of a 
particular motor insurance policy from the Database is not adequate, per se, to give 
rise to a reasonable belief that a vehicle is uninsured.
This does, though, appear to be the primary deciding factor in many cases. If so, then 
it suggests that there has been an over-reliance on the Database. It may also be 
contextualised as a feature of what Zedner calls ‘dataveillance’, or the surveillance of 
criminal, or potentially criminal, groups via the collation, storing and sharing of data 
[43; p.75]. Police use of technological tools of this nature can further be understood as 
part of a broader and long-standing drive towards developing criminal intelligence. 
Defined by Brown as ‘information which is significant or potentially significant for an 
enquiry or potential enquiry’ [5; p.340], criminal intelligence ‘has been embraced as 
the great law enforcement hope for the future’ [5; p.340]. In this sense, individual, 
“everyday” cases are reflective of the ‘“trickle down” effect from more serious, 
international crime where the justification seems more obvious’ [43; p.75].
The prioritisation of criminal intelligence is a current focus of debate [19], however, 
Brown contends that a distinction must be drawn between what constitutes 
information and what constitutes intelligence. Here, information in its raw state only 
becomes intelligence when it is linked to other information, adding “value” to the 
information and transforming it into something which can then become the basis of 
decision making [5; p.336]. We have argued above that reliance on the PNC/NID is 
not sufficient to give rise to the reasonable grounds of belief necessary to seize a 
vehicle. Using Brown’s analysis, it can also be argued that use of information gleaned 
from the Database falls short of the benchmark of intelligence which should inform 
21 This was given as the primary reason for such errors in FOI by Bedfordshire (1 March 2010), 
Gloucestershire (5 March 2010), Hampshire (24 February 2010), Kent (10 March 2010), Lancashire (5 
march 2010), Leicestershire (25 February 2010), Metropolitan Police (18 March 2010), and 
Warwickshire (10 March 2010) Constabularies.
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the decision to proceed. Moreover, over-reliance on the PNC/NID is, perhaps, 
reflective of an unhelpful preoccupation and prioritisation of technology within the 
police service in the execution of their duties.
Undoubtedly, developments in technology have had a continual impact on the 
delivery of policing in the UK, dating back as far as provision made for forensic 
science laboratories and wireless depots in the Police Act 1919 [33]. At first sight, it 
appears that harnessing technological advances serve to enhance the provision of 
policing;
New technologies promise improved effectiveness and efficiency in policing. 
Technologies extend the physical capacities of police officers to see, hear, 
recognise, record, remember, match, verify, analyse and communicate. [9; p.655]
The beneficial aspects of “technological” policing are perhaps best encapsulated, 
particularly to the lay person, as the “CSI effect”: 
Perhaps the most prominent current example … is the TV show CSI (Crime Scene 
Investigation), focussing on homicide detectives, assisted by creative and incisive 
technical support staff, using a dazzling array of state-of-the-art technology, 
combined with hugely powerful databases, to perform scientific analyses of crime 
scenes and victims to conclusively establish the identity of the killer. [32; p.203]
The “CSI effect” is indicative of the desire for policing to be scientific, as science is 
seen as neutral, impartial and free from human error [10]. However, whilst proponents 
of technological policing may be blinded to its drawbacks [22],22 others are keen to 
warn against the potential negative consequences of such developments [31].
Former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, John Alderson, published Policing  
Freedom over thirty years ago. In it, he argues that the police have become seduced 
by the brilliance of technology, writing that technology ‘has had a profound effect on 
police methods, public image and reputation, to say nothing of police psychology.’ [1; 
p.41] He further states: ‘This seductive power of technology has resulted in a false 
22 Although Manning [22] also recognises that technological advances often meet resistance from 
serving police officers at varying levels who are, for instance, sceptical of their efficacy or mistrustful 
as to the extent to which they may diminish their role.
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assumption that, together with the legal powers, it provides the essence of policing. 
This is a profound mistake’ [1; p.41]. 
Alderson’s concerns continue to have resonance, and are perhaps even more of a 
concern now. The police could easily become over-reliant on technology, in this 
instance the PNC/NID, viewing it as unquestionable, unfailing, and incapable of being 
wrong. This is a key problem with police prioritisation of technology: it fails to allow 
for, or accept the possibility of, technological failure, and officers at a scene may not 
consider the possibility that the non-appearance of insurance details on the Database 
could be an error. This may result in an unwillingness to give the driver a reasonable 
chance to prove that their car was correctly insured, and officers may not take 
additional action themselves to try to verify drivers’ claims. In spite of the well-
known potential problems with technology of this nature,23 the pronouncement of the 
computer is prioritised over the driver’s word. The result is that the insured driver, an 
innocent citizen, may experience harm, ranging from inconvenience to 
embarrassment, distress, intimidation, public shaming, loss of time, and financial loss. 
Insurance: Proof and Disbelief
We have argued that absence of insurance details from the PNC/NID is not, in itself, 
sufficient to give rise to the reasonable grounds necessary to enable seizure of a car. 
Here, we assess whether such reasonable grounds are present when a driver is also 
unable to produce her insurance certificate at the time she was stopped. That is, 
whether this additional fact is enough to take the officer from reasonable suspicion to 
reasonable belief. 
Some police forces do seem to assume that this additional fact is sufficient to enable 
seizure of a vehicle. In reply to a Freedom of Information request, Devon and 
Cornwall Police state:
23 Whilst there are some undeniable benefits attached to the growth in the use of technology generally, 
and information technology specifically, by the police (see e.g. Bowling [2] for a positive evaluation of 
the NYPD’s Compstat system), developments in this area cannot wholly be accepted as a good. 
Manning [22], for example, details the inefficacy of crime mapping as an analytical tool. Similarly, 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (cited in Chan [6]) found that increased use of computerised record 
systems has not improved accuracy or efficiency in the keeping of records. More broadly, Parenti [32] 
identifies police adoption of paramilitary style technologies as a gateway to aggressive policing tactics 
and even brutality.
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Officers at the roadside will check the National Motor Insurers (sic) Database and 
DVLA Database to determine if insurance is held and if the driver is correctly 
licensed to drive.  Should information from the databases indicate either insurance 
is not held or the driver is not correctly licensed, then the Officer can use his 
seizure powers under Section 165 (sic) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 unless the 
driver can provide proof at the roadside that insurance is held or their licence is 
valid.24
Similarly, Gloucester Constabulary state that they have seized vehicles where absence 
from the Database along with a driver’s inability to prove their vehicle was being 
lawfully driven led officers to believe it was being driven unlawfully.25 
We question, however, whether an inability to produce one’s insurance certificate, or 
driving licence, at the roadside when asked to do so is an additional factor sufficient 
to take the officer from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief. First, s. 165A RTA 
states that the power to seize a vehicle arises only if the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe, say, that it is being driven without insurance and the driver is 
unable to provide proof of insurance at the roadside; this is clear from section 
165A(3) which empowers an officer to seize a vehicle if:
(a) a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce 
evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of 
section 143 [ie: without valid motor insurance], 
(b) the person fails to produce such evidence, and 
(c) the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was 
being so driven (emphasis added).26
Given that reasonable grounds for belief are required in addition to the failure to 
produce a certificate of insurance, it seems mistaken to conclude that the latter can be 
a contributing factor in shaping the former. 
Further, where police are randomly stopping cars to check whether they are being 
driven lawfully, it would only be necessary to check the PNC/NID if a driver could 
not produce evidence of insurance; this check would be unnecessary if the driver had 
24 FOI reply, 4 March 2010.
25 FOI reply, 5 March 2010.
26 Section 165A(2) is similar and relates to reasonable grounds for believing that a vehicle is being 
driven without a valid driver’s licence. Section 165A(4) empowers an officer to seize a vehicle where 
the vehicle has not stopped when required to do so and the officer believes that it is being driven 
without insurance or a valid driving licence.
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such proof. Thus, if we are correct in assuming that absence from the Database is not 
in itself sufficient to give rise to reasonable belief, it must be the case that a 
circumstance that preceded the database being checked (i.e. the driver is unable to 
provide evidence of insurance) is incapable of making up the shortfall to give rise to 
belief.27
The additional failure to recognise the name of an insurance company is also, perhaps, 
inadequate to form reasonable belief, at least without further investigation. It may 
form suspicion, but not belief. Arguably, given the impact of seizure for a driver, the 
police could and should, take reasonable steps to verify the existence of an insurance 
company before acting. It is worth noting here that entering ‘DNA insurance’ into 
Google, and restricting the search to UK pages, gives over 3,000 results. It may also 
be asked whether, when a driver claims that they can get proof that their car is being 
driven with valid insurance, the police should not make every attempt to facilitate 
this. 
Retaining Vehicles
Once a vehicle has been seized it may be removed and retained. Section 165B RTA 
empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations authorising this. These may 
specify the fee that must be paid before a vehicle is released. Importantly, these 
regulations, 
must provide that a person who would otherwise be liable to pay … will not be 
liable to pay if – 
(a) he was not driving the motor vehicle at the time in question, and
(b) he did not know that the vehicle was being driven at that time, had not 
consented to its being driven and could not, by the taking of reasonable steps, 
have prevented it from being driven (emphasis added).28
The Home Office explanatory memorandum on the operation of section 165(B) gives 
the reason for this provision: ‘to ensure that no-one is unfairly penalised or deprived 
27 Moreover, surely a significant number of drivers do not carry evidence of insurance with them as a 
matter of course. Thus, the inability to produce such evidence when asked to do so is relatively 
unremarkable and so should perhaps be considered insufficient to take an officer from reasonable 
suspicion to reasonable belief.
28 Section 165B(3).
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of a vehicle he owns’ [14; para 7.4]. Given our research, we question why this is the 
only exemption required by the legislation. 
Police forces may adopt their own reimbursement policy for vehicles incorrectly 
seized – though neither the RTA nor its attendant regulations oblige them to do so. 
Some forces reimburse drivers whose vehicle is subsequently proved to be lawfully 
driven [26; p.7]; others do so only if the seizure was due to their error.29 Even where 
there is a reimbursement policy, innocent drivers will still have to pay to retrieve 
vehicles – initially at least. Some may feel so demoralized by their experience that 
they are loath to prolong it in an attempt to have their money returned.30 Some may be 
unable to afford the charge with the result that it will be increased on a daily basis and 
their vehicle might eventually be destroyed. We question whether there needs to be an 
exchange of money at all; surely those who can prove that their vehicle was being 
driven lawfully can simply have it returned.
The Public Police Operating as a Private Entity
Zedner talks about a shift in emphasis from the idea of a post-crime society, where 
crime is responded to after it has occurred, to a pre-crime society which draws on risk 
and security doctrines to go beyond traditional crime prevention tactics [44]. 
Describing ‘a society in which the possibility of forestalling risks competes with and 
even takes precedence over responding to wrongs done’, she highlights developments 
which are essentially pre-emptive measures to eliminate risk even where none exists 
[44; p.262]. Further, she notes that the distinction between public and private policing 
is becoming less clear – in fact, she equates post-crime activity with the functions of 
the public police and pre-crime with the private, “for profit” domain. Similarly, 
Loader notes the trend developing since the early 1980s within the public police 
towards marketisation – the police becoming more influenced by market principles, 
and in some cases charging for particular services [20 and 43]. That charges of over 
£100 can be incurred by those thought to be driving uninsured leads us to consider the 
possibility that the police service, and/or associated organisations, are profiting 
financially from traffic stops of this nature, above the actual administrative costs 
which the stop and retention of the vehicle may reasonably incur. 
29 This is the case with Hampshire Constabulary: FOI reply, 24 February 2010.
30 Lisa indicated that this was the case with her.
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We raise this for three important reasons. First, the applicable regulations [37] do not 
make clear how the current figures of £150 to cover the cost of removal, and £20 per 
day to cover the cost of retaining, the vehicle have been calculated. Further, we have 
been unable to uncover a rationale for how the Department of Transport has arrived at 
these figures in terms of what the charges are specifically designed to cover, and how 
they can be broken down into exact component figures. This leads us to question 
whether the figures have been established in an arbitrary manner. 
Second, given that vehicles seized by the police are removed by car transporter, and 
then retained at an impound site, we are concerned that, for some forces at least, 
contractual financial relationships are being forged with private organisations who 
will charge for the use of their facilities. If this is the case, it would constitute a clear 
example of both the blurring of the lines between public and private policing [17 and 
42] and the burgeoning private security industry [18]. 
Third, and perhaps most pertinent, we question why charges are made for the seizure 
and removal of vehicles at all. While driving without insurance is a criminal offence, 
there seems to be no reason why those whom the police believe to have committed the 
offence should be charged for the processing of their case. This approach is not taken 
for those charged with equivalent or more serious motoring offences such as driving 
while under the influence of alcohol or causing death by dangerous driving; costs 
pertaining to these offences are covered within policing and other criminal justice 
agency budgets and thus are ultimately paid for by the taxpayer. Meanwhile, it is 
commonplace for fixed penalty notices to be issued for minor motoring offences such 
as exceeding the speed limit [36; s. 51 and schedule 3]. We question why a third 
approach – charging for the seizure and retention of vehicles – is used for those 
driving without insurance or driver’s licence (or those erroneously thought to be doing 
so).
The idea that the police may stand to gain financially is unpalatable in cases where 
vehicles are being driven unlawfully, and against the spirit and ethos of a public 
police service. Where this is occurring when the driver is insured, the police may be 
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vulnerable to speculation that they are operating on a “for profit” basis, regardless of 
the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of their evidence.
Reiner contends that previous models of police accountability have been usurped by a 
‘calculative and contractual’ model [34]. In the UK, in the wake of the Sheehy Report 
[37], and reflecting the post-1979 broader move towards privatisation and 
marketisation, police accountability is both administered and measured via market 
disciplines – the setting and meeting of targets, audits, and performance management. 
Loader [20] contends that this drift towards consumerism is wholly contrary to 
traditional notions of democratic policing, in that the public who access the services 
of the police are increasingly responded to as customers exercising their purchasing 
power rather than citizens exercising their democratic right to secure access to 
(limited) police resources. The implications for police accountability are clear – if the 
public are encouraged to develop a sense that any solution to crime “problems” can be 
bought, it is possible that problems regarding the function of the police will be viewed 
as problems that can be overcome by buying “better” services rather than problems to 
be addressed via recognised formal accountability structures [17]. In short, the 
movement towards private activity within the public police is indicative of the 
dilution of the ‘sacred’ representation of the police as ‘symbols of law, order and 
nation’ [20; p.387] who must be held accountable on more counts than the value for 
money they offer.
In any event, drawing on Zedner’s work it is clear that these encounters are indicative 
of strategies of pre-emption which permeate police activity at every level, ranging 
from the micro (for example, the management of traffic offences) to the macro (for 
example, anti-terrorist activity). We submit that current trends towards pre-emption 
which leave behind established notions of standard crime prevention, blended with the 
speedy and steady growth of the private security industry, are particularly worrying. 
Johnston [17] contends that the period between approximately 1800 and 
approximately 1970, where public policing was the dominant form of policing and 
viewed as the most appropriate, is an aberration; the inevitable intention of policing 
within capitalist societies is to be a wholly commercial enterprise, and shifts towards 
more private forms of policing evident throughout the last 30 years are indicative of 
policing returning to its ‘natural’ state. Zedner’s claim that ‘private security is by 
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nature entrepreneurial and springs up where opportunity arises’ indicates that 
organisations seeking to exploit the current climate are not beyond creating such 
openings where none actually exist [43; p.105]; it seems to us that “inventing” crime 
before it actually occurs, when it may never occur, opens up a whole new range of 
pre-emptive and profitable opportunities. 
Fairness, Harm and Accountability
Drawing on discussions surrounding developments in criminal justice as a function of 
the risk doctrines associated with late modernity, Hudson contends that crime 
prevention has undergone a significant shift in emphasis from risk management to risk 
control [15]. Identifying risk management as a constant feature of policing, she asserts 
that the new trend is that strategies developed to this end now cross the line of 
acceptability in terms of both proportion and target, in an attempt to control, rather 
than simply manage, the potential for criminal activity. Further, she contends that the 
focus on groups of actual or potential offenders, rather than individuals within a 
specific context, is reflective of the ‘turn that seems to have taken place from justice 
to vengeance, from due process to gloves-off crime control’ [15; p.45]. For Hudson, 
the result is that 
The new systems of risk control violate some of the fundamental tenets of due 
process. The principles of no punishment without conviction, and proportionality 
of punishment to harm done, are set aside by the new technologies of risk. [15; 
p.67]
Just as core principles of criminal justice have undergone a significant paradigm shift, 
one of the central theoretical principles of policing – that the police should be 
accountable to the people – has also evolved. Brodeur [4] discusses “high” policing, 
essentially state policing on a macro level predominantly geared towards maintaining 
national security, and identifies this as conceptually distinct from “low” policing, the 
regular, “everyday” police work of the street. However, he demonstrates that the core 
principles of high policing - heightened importance of intelligence, conflation of 
powers which should be separate, focus on national security, and technological 
surveillance – are increasingly infiltrating aspects of low policing. Whilst high 
policing activity is held accountable via political hierarchies, low policing is thought 
to be accountable to the judiciary.
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Similarly, Chan [7] notes that the conceptual basis of police accountability, rather 
than prioritising the needs of the public and the rule of law, now revolves around 
pragmatism, managerialism, and risk management. She demonstrates the failings of 
such approaches to police accountability, and the public perception that the traditional 
purpose and spirit of police accountability should be restored. Summing up the central 
problem of this shift, she states that: ‘The new accountability’s project of managing 
the risk of official misconduct is continually frustrated by evidence of its failure and 
the attendant swing back to punitive control strategies’ [7; p.266].
It is against this contextual backdrop that we need to consider Lisa’s experience. 
Given that the police appear to have relied mainly, or perhaps entirely, on the NID, an 
‘electronic technique’ symptomatic of the move towards ‘following people’s 
movements through and across computerised databases’ [15; p.45], and given that, 
without ‘due process’, the net result has been a financial penalty, it can be argued that 
the police have effectively acted as judge and jury themselves. On the grounds of 
faulty evidence, they have arguably concluded that Lisa was guilty of driving without 
insurance and handed down the punishment of what effectively is a fine. 
In short, the police can be understood as going beyond their commonly recognised 
boundaries and treading on the toes of the courts, in terms of considering evidence, 
establishing guilt, and handing down punishment, a practice which has potential 
implications for the principle of due process and the wider principles of justice upon 
which the whole criminal justice system should be based. As Tugendhat J stated in a 
defamation case brought against the police: ‘The imposition of sanctions is a matter 
for the courts, after conviction, and never for the police.’31 
Further, because the police are acting outside their established role and function [36], 
it is questionable whether they can be sufficiently held to account, and whether their 
actions could be challenged by the public. The system of checks and balances to 
which they have traditionally been subjected may be less able to deal with a police 
service acting outside their acknowledged remit. More specifically, the danger is that 
when the police are responsible for determining guilt and punishment, the oversight 
31 Wood v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2003] EWHC 297, [50].
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role played by the courts, and to some extent the Crown Prosecution Service, is 
absent. In any event, it is further evidence of the permeation of everyday, “low” 
policing by the principles of “high” policing, whereby ‘the conflation of legal, judicial 
and executive power is one of [its] defining aspects’ [4; p.32].
This distortion of the police’s function in terms of criminal justice has had a 
significant and long lasting effect on Lisa. In total, she has incurred a financial loss as 
a result of these events totalling £117, a loss which she felt unable to recoup because 
she was so distressed by the episode. She also felt ‘very intimidated’ by the situation 
and ‘didn’t want to start challenging the police’ by seeking reimbursement. 
For Lisa, this was compounded by two significant features of the way she was 
responded to by officers at the scene. First, her sensation that the officers she was 
stopped by thought she was ‘stupid’, treating her in a dismissive and patronising way 
because they assumed that she was mistaken in thinking that DNA could be the name 
of an insurance broker. Second, her sensation that she had been responded to in a 
gendered fashion – she felt that the officers might have treated her differently, to use 
her words, ‘had it been a male’ that they were dealing with. She also recalls the male 
officers in question speaking to her brother in a way which was wholly different than 
the way with which she was dealt. In short, Lisa feels that the officers’ confusion over 
the existence of an insurance company named DNA, coupled with their reactions to 
her as a woman driver, resulted in them treating her in a dismissive and 
condescending way.
This is illustrative of the paradoxical relationship between the use of technology in 
policing and the role of individual officer discretion. On the one hand, officers may 
feel compelled to seize vehicles because the computer has effectively told them to do 
so. Yet, at the same time, officers are arguably able to employ their discretion as to 
their conduct once a driver has been stopped, and the decisions they subsequently take 
- for example, whether or not to seek further information as to the existence or non-
existence of an insurance company. Given the array of research on the problematic 
nature of individual police discretion and the ways it can be influenced by both 
personal beliefs and “cop culture” [39, 23, 40 and 6], it is entirely possible that 
officers may make discriminatory decisions about how to proceed in a particular case, 
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decisions which they can absolve themselves of by deflecting “blame” on to the 
computer. In other words, officers can still operate their discretion even when reliance 
on the database arguably removes it. 
 
We referred above to the case of Stephen Farndon who had his car seized on the 
motorway resulting in him walking along a motorway slip road with his family; he 
said, in reference to the way he was treated: ‘You are perceived guilty by the side of 
the road before you get a chance to prove you are innocent’ [12]. As we have seen 
throughout this piece, and through cases such as Lisa’s and Mr Farndon’s, the 
potential for harm in this area, in terms of misadministration of justice, is 
considerable. 
Perhaps the more long-term harm however is that Lisa now reports having feelings of 
mistrust towards the police, and a belief that the police have exercised their power in 
her case both erroneously and in a manner which goes beyond the principle of 
“reasonableness”. It is not uncommon for people to report a change in attitude 
towards, and lack of confidence in, the police after a negative encounter [11, 38, 12]. 
The cynicism, wariness and even opposition that can develop towards the police after 
such an experience is perhaps however reminiscent of Alderson’s warning that ‘The 
police have to balance the desire and need to increase their efficiency with the 
genuine fear of the public against over-mighty officialdom’ [1; p.106]. Arguably, calls 
by Alderson to be mindful of the ‘human side’ of policing continue in some cases to 
be ignored, an area of neglect which, Tyler [41] notes, further erodes the respect, 
acceptance and good will of the public required for the police to be seen as 
functioning legitimately, fairly, and with the consent of the people.
Finally, we question whether Lisa, and others like her, have been treated fairly. We 
noted earlier the Home Office claim that the regulations governing the retention of 
vehicles seized seek to ‘ensure that no-one is unfairly penalised or deprived of a 
vehicle he owns’ (emphasis added) [26]. Similarly, the Police (Conduct) Regulations 
2008 state: ‘Police officers act with fairness and impartiality’ (emphasis added).32 
Likewise, Merseyside Police promise: ‘We will treat everyone we deal with fairly, 
32 Schedule 1, paragraph 1.The previous regulations similarly stated: ‘Police officers have a particular 
responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality in all their dealings with the public and their 
colleagues’: Police (Conduct) Regulation 2004, schedule 1, paragraph 1.
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openly and according to their needs’ (emphasis added) [25]. Indeed, the first promise 
of the Policing Pledge, which all 43 forces in England and Wales have signed up to, 
states: ‘We will always treat you fairly with dignity and respect …’ (emphasis added) 
[8]. Given these sentiments, it is legitimate to ask whether the powers to seize 
vehicles are exercised in a way that is fair.
It seems to us that Lisa was not treated fairly. She was deprived of her property 
though innocent of any crime. This caused her considerable inconvenience, distress 
and embarrassment. She felt that she had been mocked and dealt with in a dismissive 
way by the officers at the scene. No consideration seemed to have been given as to 
how she could most conveniently prove that her car was insured or to how she could 
easily reclaim her property. She suffered a significant financial loss. The way in 
which she was treated seems to fall short of the promise of Merseyside Police to treat 
everyone they deal with fairly, the sentiments expressed in the Policing Pledge, or 
with the Home Office’s aspiration that the regulations should not unfairly penalise 
drivers. 
It is notable that Lisa remained visibly distressed by the ordeal when interviewed by 
us two years after the event. She said that she had felt ‘helpless’, that she had been in 
a ‘David and Goliath situation’ and that she had ‘never felt so small’.
Conclusion
Enforcing traffic laws even in democracies poses a particular challenge for public 
trust in police. It generates a high number of citizen contacts, including with 
citizens historically or socially otherwise disposed to support police, in situations 
in which strict enforcement is likely to leave citizens disgruntled if not handled 
carefully. [11; p.452].
Goldsmith’s point, above, succinctly encapsulates the main thrust of our argument. In 
many cases in the UK, the only direct contact that members of the public have with 
the police is because of motoring offences, actual or potential. When processed 
erroneously, incorrectly, and with a lack of respect – as Lisa’s case was – the result 
can be loss of trust and confidence in the police as a force for good. This, coupled 
with the lack of clarity regarding why motorists are charged a fee to reclaim their 
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vehicles, not to mention how the fee is calculated, has led us to question the 
legitimacy of the police’s actions. The public already display a degree of mistrust 
towards certain developments in police technology [31]; we suggest that phenomena 
we have discussed here will only exacerbate the situation.
There are a number of ways in which the police could operate their power of seizure 
in a fairer and more accountable way. First, forces should ensure that vehicles are 
seized only when there are reasonable grounds for believing that they have been 
driven unlawfully. Officers should be reminded not to unduly rely on the PNC/NID, 
that information contained there may be incorrect, and that absence from the Database 
does not give sufficient grounds to seize a vehicle. Second, we suggest that where a 
driver claims that they are driving lawfully officers should take reasonable steps to 
verify this or enable drivers to do so thereby allowing them to continue on their 
journey with minimal inconvenience. Third, it is questionable whether charging 
drivers to reclaim their vehicles is legitimate – particularly where they are innocent of 
any offence. If it was thought necessary, any costs incurred in dealing with unlawfully 
driven vehicles could be collected by the courts in the form of an enhanced fine after 
conviction. Where charges are made, we believe that those who are forced to pay 
them are made aware, or are able to discover, how they have been calculated. Fourth, 
each force should record how many seized vehicles are subsequently discovered to 
have been driven lawfully. This record should indicate the reasons for seizure. 
Without this, no assessment can be made of whether a particular force is exceeding its 
power or subjecting innocent drivers to a disproportionate, illegitimate burden. This, 
in turn, reduces the possibility of holding individual forces to account.
Taking into account Brodeur’s [4] conceptualisation of high and low policing, we 
contend that Lisa’s case, and others like it, are an example of the principal features of 
high policing being employed to deal with incidents normally the focus of low 
policing. As such, we suggest that existing structures of accountability are designed to 
manage public policing in its low form, not a form of public policing which is imbued 
with market principles and infiltrated by elements of high policing. If driving 
with(out) insurance is to be policed by the means discussed here, methods of holding 
the police to account when errors are made must adapt accordingly.
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